A transition towards a post-growth economy requires social policies that successfully secure human needs and well-being –  while also enabling much lower material and ecological footprints.  

By now, much academic work has been published elaborating what such social policies might look like. The concept of ‘eco-social policies’ has emerged to describe policies that secure both a ‘social floor’ (minimum standards of living), but importantly also a ‘social ceiling’ (maximum income or wealth), or for instance also ‘universal basic services’. In short, redistribution and public provision of certain needs is discussed in this literature. The literature also includes work time reduction in order to secure employment in a degrowth economy.    

However, policies that are described as ‘eco-social’ might be controversial to parts of the population. Therefore, it is important to uncover dynamics of public legitimacy if such policy ideas are to survive and be implemented in a democratic society. From a small body of academic research, we also know that familiar variables in political attitudes also matter here – such as ideological values, political trust or socio-economic background (income and education).  

 Support for degrowth social policy in Denmark 

We collected survey data about support for these policy ideas in our home country of Denmark. We had 2714 respondents from a representative panel maintained by the survey provider YouGov. Denmark is no exception to the familiar pattern whereby affluent (mostly Western) countries churn through the planet with levels of material throughput that are several times higher per capita than what would be sustainable. Actually, Denmark is among the Western countries with the highest material and ecological footprints. This is the ecological dark side of the Nordic welfare economy.  

To be more specific, we asked questions about nine specific policy ideas that we found to be important in our review of the academic literature.  

• Reducing working hours for full-time employees to 30 hours per week (from 37 hours) 

• A public ‘job guarantee’, which secures a job for anyone who cannot find employment on their own 

• Banning advertisements for environmentally harmful luxury consumption  

• An unconditional minimum income 

• A maximum income ceiling to be implemented, so that all incomes above the ceiling are taxed at 100% 

• Increased wealth taxation (stocks and other assets) 

• Public legislation and support to promote smaller and alternative forms of housing (for instance ‘tiny houses’)  

• Increased funding for public transportation 

• Less production of livestock in the agricultural sector (meat production) 

We tried to measure both support and opposition – asking respondents to pick up to three policies that they support but also asking them to select up to three policies that they are against. Support and opposition are not always just mirror images of each other – policies that get a lot of support from some might also simultaneously get a lot of opposition from others in a polarized political climate. Or, vice versa, some policies might get both very little active support but also receive very little active opposition. In a democracy, it might sometimes be the case that hostility and opposition towards policies is more important for politicians‘ decisions.   

Main results 

Here we will summarize our most important results. The figure below shows the basic distribution of which policies were chosen most often (or least often) by respondents – both when we ask about what they support, and what they oppose. 

Figure 1: Share of the population who are in favour of (pro) or against (anti) degrowth policies (Percentages)

Notes: N=2714  

For the favored policies (pro), we can see that increased funding for public transportation was chosen most often, being selected by almost half of the respondents (48,2%). This is followed by reducing working hours to 30 hours a week (37%) and implementing legislation that supports smaller and alternative forms of housing (32,8%). As examples of policy ideas that are really on the public agenda in Denmark, a job guarantee and minimum income also attract some support (just below 30%). Higher capital gains taxes (17.3%), less livestock production (17.9%) and banning commercials for environmentally harmful products (19.6%) were the least chosen policies. 

For the most disfavored degrowth policies (anti), the pattern among Danes is quite different and not simply the opposite of the image of support. Four policies stand out as being particularly unpopular: higher taxes on capital gains (47,9%), maximum income (47,3%), minimum income (43,3%) and fewer livestock (44,4%). In contrast, there are three degrowth policies that very few are against – banning advertisements on harmful goods (1,6%), a jobs guarantee (2,5%) and working fewer hours (2,7%). 

Generally, elements of a ‘social ceiling’ that break with established market incentives behind growth face strong opposition (maximum income limits and higher capital gains taxes). To some extent, this also applies to the ‘social floor’ of a minimum income, although this policy attracts an interesting mix of support and opposition. Livestock production (i.e., meat production and consumption), as a high-profile example of unsustainable living standards, is also contested. 

Dynamics of support and opposition for degrowth policy 

 In terms of the dynamics behind support and opposition, we find three main results in the paper.  

Firstly, it is important to distinguish between support and opposition, as they are not necessarily mirror images. We found that opposition was much more concentrated towards some degrowth policies – for instance, policies that are supposed to ensure a ‘social ceiling’ (maximum income and wealth taxation). Maximum income is also an example of how the average voter is simply not used to discussing some of the policies discussed by the degrowth movement.  

Secondly, opposition is not simply directed towards policies that might be described as ‘radical’ or ‘transformative’. For instance, support can be found for reduced working hours, job guarantees, and minimum income. Rather, we suggest that it is a question of whether loss of income or reductions in material consumption is very visible and concentrated (income and wealth taxation directed towards the rich). This suggests that there is also a belief in Denmark to some degree of economic ‘meritocracy’ – the belief that hard work, education and skills matter for why some people have high income or wealth. Opposition towards visible losses is clear with respect to lifestyles associated with meat consumption and animal intensive agriculture. 

Thirdly, patterns of support and opposition for many of these policies suggest that they do not have a clear connection to ecological sustainability for most respondents. Many responded according to their ideological values and socio-economic status (income and education) similarly to other more traditional policy issues about income and redistribution. Policy ideas like maximum or minimum incomes, wealth taxation, etc. are not affected by ecological worldviews or concern for climate change.  

However, with respect to smaller or alternative forms of housing, it is noteworthy that support didn’t follow familiar left-right divides like other policies – in other words, we see a potential to go beyond established ideological divides when degrowth policies seem to be perceived as a matter of freedom and simple self-sufficiency. 

A future for degrowth beyond ideological divides?  

At the end of the paper, we discuss a few issues and limitations. The most important one is that our survey is a snapshot of attitudes among ordinary voters in Denmark – in a political climate where very few voters know much about what ‘degrowth’ is or have a clear idea about why redistribution or public services have anything to do with a green transition. Like in other countries, critiques of the growth economy still come mostly from small green parties or fringe left-wing parties.  

All of this means that support and opposition for degrowth policies still largely follow familiar left-right divides. It rarely follows their attitudes towards the environment or concern for climate change. This can be framed as a problem for the degrowth movement.  

On the other hand, it also shows that there is potential for mobilizing beyond ideological values – mobilizing for a positive future with less dependence on ever-increasing production and consumption. And potential for framing how it is also a matter of freedom and self-sufficiency, and yes, equality in the sense that a wellbeing economy should be for everyone.  

Our paper does not show how people’s attitudes towards such policies might change with active and effective framing or their perception of “degrowth”, which they know very little about. There are clear limitations to collecting quantitative surveys about policy ideas that are not yet part of the political mainstream.  

This potential for mobilizing around what is really steps towards degrowth is higher than previously in Denmark. Many are beginning to realize that a true green transition is more than just climate policy, and more than just more “renewable energy”. Reductions in animal production and land use is becoming public policy, and biodiversity policy is high on the agenda. Awareness of the need for less material throughput is increasing. However, many do not yet connect these issues with critiques of a growth-dependent economy. Actual policies are still far from what would amount to actual degrowth.  

If you are interested in all the details of our methodology and results, the full academic paper is open access for everyone right here in Ecological Economics: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S092180092500182X?via%3Dihub